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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation of manufacturing into highly integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing of some of the conventional wisdom regarding the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
Conflict and Development—Lessons from South Asia
Ejaz Ghani and Lakshmi Iyer
South Asia is the second most violent place on earth after Iraq. Conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have attracted global attention. Parts of 
India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal have experienced long-running conflict. Conflicts result in death, misery, social trauma, destruction of infrastructure, 
and have huge spillover effects. What is conflict? Where is it concentrated? Is conflict a problem for development, or a failure of development? What 
should policy makers do? 
What Is Conflict?
Conflict is a clash between two opposing groups, and can be 
external or internal to the country. An example of external 
clash is state-to-state conflict (interstate war). This kind of con-
flict has declined. But internal conflict is on the rise. Indeed, 
internal conflicts have resulted in three times as many deaths as 
external conflicts, or interstate wars, since World War II 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Internal conflict is a loose term. It can be classified into two 
broad categories (Ghani and Iyer 2010). The first category is 
conflict against the state. Examples of this are civil war, separat-
ist movements, and suicide bombings. Suicide bombings are 
an extreme manifestation of conflict carried out by a relatively 
organized group of nonstate actors, and their goal is the desta-
bilization of the state; all such incidents will be referred to here 
as terrorism. The second category is people-to-people conflict. 
Examples of this include conflicts between ethnic and social 
groups, localized land conflicts, religious riots, homicides, do-
mestic violence, common violence, or other crimes. Ethnic and 
religious violence stand out in people-to-people conflict (Stew-
art 2010; Varshney 2002). 
The two types of internal conflicts have evolved differently 
in South Asia. People-to-people conflict has declined: in India, 
clashes between Hindus and Muslims have not increased over 
the past decade, and homicide rates have declined substantial-
ly. But conflict against the state has increased. Researchers tend 
to focus on conflict against the state, because it has greater im-
plications for the stability of the state itself, and therefore im-
pacts states’ abilities to implement develop e tal policy. The 
impact of eople-to-people conflict is less severe compare  to 
conflict against the state. 
These two categories of conflict make it easier to explore po-
tential relationships between conflict and development. Such 
an approach is also better aligned with the economic literature 
on institutions and economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001). Of the different types of institutions which 
have been identified as important to development—market-
creating institutions, market-regulating institutions, market 
substituting institutions—the type that has received relatively 
little attention is that of conflict management or market-legiti-
mizing institutions.  Yet political stability is a prerequisite for 
implementing changes to any of the other types of institutions. 
Even in a best-case scenario, the presence of even low-level con-
flict places constraints on the kinds of policies governments can 
implement.  
Is Conflict a Problem for Development, or a 
Failure of Development? 
Figure 1 plots the internal conflict rate and real per capita in-
come for a large group of countries. The vertical axis reports the 
number of people killed in terrorist incidents (nor alized by 
population) as a measure of conflict rate (it excludes state-to-
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state conflict and common crime). The horizontal axis plots 
real GDP per capita. The downward sloping line suggests that 
countries that have low per capita income have a higher conflict 
rate. This is consistent with other findings in the literature that 
report higher conflict rates in low-income countries (Collier et 
al. 2003). 
However, the relationship between conflict and per capita 
income is not very tight. High income can’t guarantee peace 
and stability. There are many countries that are outliers. It is 
quite striking that many South Asian countries are outliers: In-
dia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal all have much higher con-
flict rates than expected for their stage of development. 
One cannot infer causality from figure 1. Conflict may be 
contributing to low per capita income, or low income may be 
contributing to conflict. The poverty-conflict link is a two-way 
relationship. A better understanding of causality has big poli-
cy implications. If it is conflict that holds back growth, then 
policy makers should focus on controlling conflict, perhaps by 
increasing military and police interventions to reduce con-
flict. But if it is low income and high poverty that cause con-
flict, then the focus should be on direct policy interventions to 
reduce poverty and human misery. In India, there is some evi-
dence that states that had more welfare and less police had less 
violence than states that had more police and less welfare (Jus-
tino 2009). 
If cross-country data suggest an inverse association between 
conflict incidents and per capita income, would subnational 
data also show that conflict rates are higher in lagging regions 
compared to leading regions within countries (lagging regions 
have lower per capita income compared to national average)? 
Indeed, this is exactly the situation in South Asia. 
Figure 2 shows that in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka, conflict is concentrated in the lagging regions. 
The lagging regions of Pakistan (Balochistan, Federally Admin-
istered Tribal Areas [FATA], and North-West Frontier Province 
[NWFP]), India (Maoist insurgency in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, and Orissa), and Sri Lanka (northern province), 
have high conflict rates. Nepal appears to be an exception in 
terms of showing greater conflict in leading regions (figure 3). 
The differences in conflict intensity across leading and lag-
ging regions are statistically significant, as shown by formal t-
tests (table 1). In South Asia as a whole, lagging regions experi-
enced more than three times the number of terrorist incidents 
per capita, compared with leading regions, and almost twice as 
many deaths per capita in such incidents (see table 1, panel A, 
first two rows). This is a large difference and remains statisti-
Figure 1. Conflict and Violence (1998–2004)
Source: LaFree and Dugan (2008).
Note: The figure takes the arithmetic mean for fatalities and income per capita for the period 1998–2004. Fatality is the number of total confirmed fatalities for the incident. The 
number includes all victims and attackers who died as a direct result of the incident.
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cally significant even after controlling for changes that affected 
the whole region in any given year. 
Some of this difference is attributable to cross-country dif-
ferences: Afghanistan and Nepal are both much poorer than 
rest of South Asia, and have suffered high levels of conflict. But, 
consistent with the results in figure 3, the difference between 
lagging and leading regions is present within individual coun-
tries as well: lagging regions within Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka have more than twice the levels of per capita con-
flict than leading regions within the same countries. 
What Explains Higher Concentration of Con-
flict in Poor Regions? 
That conflict is higher in lagging regions is consistent with the 
cross-country literature on the incidence of civil war, which 
shows that poor countries are at greater risk of internal conflict 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004); Fearon and Laitin 2003). Time-
series studies of conflict find that poor economic circumstanc-
es are more likely to result in conflict: Miguel, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti (2004) find that civil war is more likely to begin in Af-
Figure 2. South Asia Conflict Intensity Map
Source: Conflict categories created by authors based on data from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database for the period 1998–2007.
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Source: RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database. 
Note: In the interests of showing the within country details, the per capita figures are per million population for Bangladesh and India, and per 100,000 for Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
and Nepal. The latter three countries experienced significantly higher levels of overall conflict per capita over this period. The MIPT data for Nepal are not of high quality. 
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Figure 3. Comparing Terrorist Incidents across Leading and Lagging Regions within Countries
Source: LaFree and Dugan (2008); RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database.
Note: Regression differences are calculated by regressing the conflict intensity on a dummy for lagging region and year fixed effects. GTD2 =  Global Terrorism 
Database II. *** Represents significance at 1 percent, ** represents significance at 5 percent, and * represents significance at 10 percent.
Table 1. Are Conflict Differences between Leading and Lagging Regions Statistically Significant?
Variable Place
Leading 
regions
Lagging  
regions Difference
Regression 
difference
Panel A: MIPT data, 1998–2007 
# terrorist incidents per 
million population
South Asia 0.399 1.195 0.796 0.796***
# fatalities per million 
population 
South Asia 0.521 1.738 1.217 1.217**
# terrorist incidents per 
million population
Bangladesh 0.115 0.105 -0.011
India 0.165 0.363 0.198
Nepal 2.056 1.511 -0.545
Pakistan 0.249 2.509 2.260
Sri Lanka 0.858 2.495 1.637
Panel B: GTD2 data, 1998–2004
# terrorist incidents per 
million population
South Asia 0.269 0.559 0.290 0.290**
# fatalities per million 
population
South Asia 4.045 11.963 7.918 7.918**
# terrorist incidents per 
million population
Bangladesh 0.096 0.050 0.047
India 0.159 0.129 -0.030
Nepal 0.864 0.698 -0.166
Pakistan 0.204 0.254 0.050
Sri Lanka 1.039 1.641 0.602
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rican countries in years following poor rainfall; Hidalgo et al. 
(2008) find that poor rainfall is associated with an increased 
incidence of land invasions in Brazil; and Dube and Vargas 
(2009) document a robust association between reduced coffee 
prices and the incidence of terrorism in Columbia. Do and Iyer 
(2010) find similar results in an analysis of conflict intensity 
across the districts of Nepal. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of poverty rates across the 
regions of South Asia, measured by the head-count ratio. The 
head-count ratio measures the percentage of population in a 
given area whose consumption is below the poverty line for that 
region. The head-count ratio here has been calculated with re-
spect to national poverty lines for the different countries.
Does poverty incidence match with the incidence of con-
flict? The analysis does show a higher incidence of conflict in 
poor and landlocked regions. Furthermore, there is a close rela-
tionship between higher poverty rates and greater conflict. One 
can easily see that western Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and 
Source: Ghani (2010). 
Figure 4. Map of Poverty Head-Count Ratio in South Asia
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some parts of eastern India have both high levels of poverty and 
high levels of conflict. 
This relationship is visible in figure 5, where we see higher 
levels of conflict in poorer regions of South Asia. This relation-
ship is not uniform within each country; in particular, it is 
much less strong across regions of Bangladesh. Indeed, this is 
not a tight relationship. Poverty figures may reflect the effect of 
any conflict in that region as well, and thus these figures cannot 
be used to make a causal statement. Furthermore, the existence 
of conflict complicates the collection of detailed data. In par-
ticular, poverty figures are not available for the northern and 
eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, which had the highest levels of 
conflict in the whole of South Asia. 
Several different interpretations can be made for any ob-
served relationship with poverty. It might be easier for rebels to 
recruit people to their cause in poorer areas, because their op-
portunity cost of conflict is relatively low. This “opportunity 
cost” hypothesis means that the relationship between poverty 
and conflict will be different for an ethnically based or separat-
ist conflict, because recruitment will be made on the basis of 
ethnicity or regional affiliation, rather than the lowest cost of 
recruitment. However, another potential interpretation is that 
poorer regions have poorer state capacity, and hence the govern-
ment is not able to deal with the rebels effectively. In fact, sepa-
ratist or ethnic conflicts are often driven by the perception of a 
specific region or group being discriminated against by the 
state. 
The cross-country literature on civil wars has documented 
several other features that appear to be important. For instance, 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) show that geographic conditions that 
favor insurgency, such as the presence of forest cover, are signifi-
cantly associated with the incidence of conflict. How far does 
this matter for the South Asian context? States in India that 
have a higher forest cover have higher conflict intensity (see fig-
ure 6). This is consistent with numerous accounts of Naxalites 
using forest cover to hide effectively from law enforcement forc-
es. Data from Sri Lanka and Nepal show a similar relationship.
In addition to economic and geographic circumstances, so-
cial divisions are often cited as a driver of conflict. For instance, 
the separatist movement in Sri Lanka began with the demands 
of ethnic Tamils for greater autonomy. Similarly, the Maoist 
rebels in Nepal often claim to be fighting on behalf of marginal-
ized sections of society, such as members of the lower castes. 
India’s northeastern states, which are the scene of long-running 
separatist movements, are socially and ethnically different from 
the majority of the states in India. 
Figure 5. Relationship between Conflict Intensity and Poverty Rates
Source: RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database. Poverty numbers are computed by World Bank staff from individual country data sources. 
Note: MIPT data are at region level. Figure excludes Balochistan and Central Province in Nepal, which are large outliers. Data on poverty levels are not available for northern and 
eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.
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Conflicts can be triggered by low economic growth (a lower 
economic opportunity cost of rebellion against the state in poor 
areas), unequal distribution in gains from development, and 
political marginalization. Or conflict can result from shocks 
such as natural calamities or commodity price shocks. The lag-
ging regions of South Asia suffer from both types of problems—
low economic growth and higher vulnerability to natural ca-
lamities (Ghani 2010; Ahmed, Kalegama, and Ghani 2010). 
The consequences of conflict on development are more se-
vere in lagging regions due to weak institutions, poor geogra-
phy, and weak integration with global markets.  These are also 
the characteristics that limit economic growth in lagging re-
gions. Leading regions also suffer from conflict but are better 
able to contain and manage them because of administrative 
and economic dynamism (which includes job creation capacity 
and effective safety net programs). 
What Should Policy Makers Do to Reduce 
Conflict? 
A speech given by the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan 
Singh, to a conference on Internal Security and Law and Order 
in 2005, sums up the story of conflict and development: 
Whatever be the cause, it is difficult to deny that extremism has 
huge societal costs. Investments are unlikely to fructify, em-
ployment is not likely to grow and educational facilities may be 
impaired…the threat of Naxalism is geographically spread out 
to the more backward regions and districts of our country. 
Reducing conflict is a prerequisite to political stability, 
which, in turn, is the prerequisite for implementing pro-growth 
policies. Even in a best-case scenario, the presence of low-level 
conflict constrains the policies governments can implement to 
promote growth. 
Source: RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database on conflict for Indian states. 
Policy makers in South Asia have tried various policies to re-
duce conflict. The most common approach is to use police forc-
es to establish law and order in the affected areas. The police 
forces in South Asian countries, however, tend to be under-
staffed and underequipped. In cases in which police forces are 
insufficient, the armed forces are called in to deal with the insur-
gency. In most cases, this has not been a successful strategy. Even 
when successful in defeating the insurgents, as in Sri Lanka, the 
human cost associated with military operations is very high.
A different approach to dealing with insurgencies is to con-
duct negotiations and sign peace agreements with the insur-
gents. To be effective, this approach needs two requirements: 
(1) the government must conduct coordinated negotiations 
and fulfill at least some of the insurgents’ demands; and (2) the 
insurgent group must be genuinely interested in joining the po-
litical mainstream. This approach has been tried in some areas 
of South Asia. For instance, the Indian government has signed 
peace deals with several separatist groups in the northeastern 
states, granting them a higher degree of local autonomy in some 
cases. Similarly, negotiations with some Tamil groups in Sri 
Lanka, such as the EPRLF, have resulted in their integration 
into mainstream politics. 
Complementary to the security-based solution is an eco-
nomic solution, whereby the government expands welfare pro-
grams and reduces poverty in the conflict-affected areas to un-
dercut the support for the insurgency. This approach is 
consistent with economic backwardness as a cause of conflict. 
This approach has been tried in some conflicts in South Asia, 
but it has failed because of poor economic policy selection and 
poor implementation in conflict regions.
Policy choices and their implementation are critical in pre-
venting an escalation of conflict and in postconflict reconstruc-
Figure 6. Forest Cover and Conflict Intensity in South Asia
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tion. Economic policies should be geared not just to maximize 
growth, which would take time, but also to address the distri-
butional or political factors that led to the conflict. Policy choic-
es must be structured to reduce real or perceived inequities. 
Aid agencies should work through the existing government in-
stitutions, be practical to create jobs quickly, and in most cases, 
work on short-term economic goals first and address medium- 
and longer-term efficiency considerations later. This approach 
calls for humanitarian treatment for conflict-affected people, 
closure of refugee camps, and reintegration of refugees within 
society.
Cross-border cooperation between countries should be an 
integral part of any strategy to reduce conflict. Many of the in-
ternal conflicts in South Asia have cross-border dimensions. 
The Taliban in Afghanistan obtain significant support from 
Pakistan’s border areas. The Maoists in Nepal formed close 
links with the Maoist movements in India. Many separatist 
groups in India’s northeastern states had training camps and 
cells in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh and Bhutan. 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and other Tamil 
separatist groups in Sri Lanka have traditionally enjoyed sup-
port from the Tamil diaspora in India and other countries. In 
such a context, regional cross-border cooperation is an essential 
part of any counterinsurgency strategy. Considerable potential 
exists for regional cooperation in reducing conflict, but this has 
been an underutilized strategy in combating terrorism in 
South Asia. 
South Asian governments have taken a variety of different 
approaches to counter terrorism. Reviewing these approaches 
in the South Asian and global context, it appears that the armed 
forces or local militias have not been overly effective in combat-
ing terrorism. Strengthening police forces or conducting nego-
tiations to induce insurgents to join the political mainstream 
appear to be more effective approaches. Regional cooperation 
initiatives, which have been underutilized so far, are likely to be 
important in countering terrorism. The challenge is to find the 
right combination of these different approaches toward coun-
tering conflict, as well as the optimal economic policies to be 
adopted in postconflict environments.
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